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1 Introduction
Valued at about 17% of the world’s GDP, the informal sector represents an important compo-
nent of developing countries in particular (Schneider et al., 2010). In addition to its size, the
ability to transition in and out of the informal sector has been shown to be a crucial coping
mechanism allowing firms to weather adverse market conditions and thus could be important
with regard to trade liberalization (Mullainathan and Schnabl, 2010; Ousman and Hallward-
Driemeier, 2012). That leaves an important question, what is the role of the informal sector
on the impact of trade liberalization in general equilibrium?
In the seminal heterogeneous firm trade model by Melitz (2003), trade liberalization in-
duces firm selection on productivity into exporting and forces the least-productive firms to
exit the market. The result is improved welfare and higher average productivity. Yet, em-
pirical studies provide suggestive evidence that informality causes the dispersion of marginal
products between firms and acts as a channel through which the firm-level resource allocation
process can be distorted (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; McCaig and
Pavcnik, 2013). For instance, Nataraj (2011) shows that the productivity improvement as
a result of the Indian trade liberalization in 1991 predominantly stems from the exit of the
least-productive, informal firms. Additionally, Perry et al. (2007) find that the majority of
informal salaried workers would prefer to work in the formal sector due to a formal sector
wage premium. This raises two important questions: First, how does trade liberalization
affect labor markets in the presence of an informal sector? Second, how does the presence of
an informal sector mediate the effect of trade liberalization on welfare?
To answer these questions, this paper develops a model that incorporates informality
into a trade model with heterogeneous firms and can replicate the salient features of the
empirical literature on trade and informality. The model consists of four crucial pieces.
First, I define informality as firm-level non-compliance with registration (de Soto, 1989).1
Second, firms are heterogeneous in productivity. Third, firms opt in or out of the informal
sector according to profitability considerations. Informal sector participation is therefore an
1On a firm-level, informality is commonly defined as either registration non-compliance, tax evasion or
both of these (e.g. Fajnzylber et al., 2011). My choice of definition is motivated by several empirical findings.
de Paula and Scheinkman (2011) find that registration non-compliance and tax evasion are highly correlated.
Exploring the impact of policies on the size of the informal sector, Ulyssea (2010) finds that the reduction of
entry costs, rather than payroll taxes are effective in reducing the incidence of informality. Moreover, several
studies find that high firm registration costs do not just function as barriers to formality (Djankov et al., 2002;
Auriol and Warlters, 2005; Antunes and de V. Cavalcanti, 2007), but also lead to few and larger active firms in
an industry (Klapper et al., 2006; Fisman and Allende, 2010). Importantly, in the most cases the registration
costs are not an efficient transfer to the government, but rather red tape caused by bureaucratic hurdles and
complex registration procedures (Djankov et al., 2002).
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active entrepreneurial choice to maximize firm profits given the costs and benefits of informal
and formal sector participation.2 Fourth, labor markets are imperfect. Labor market frictions
are caused by workers’ fair wage expectations,3 and informal workers are excluded from the
formal labor market.4 The pieces come together by introducing informality into the model of
Egger and Kreickemeier (2009), which is a heterogeneous firm trade model a` la Melitz (2003)
with a fair wage specification along the lines of Akerlof and Yellen (1990).
The model delivers several predictions on the impact of trade liberalization in the presence
of informality that correspond closely to the findings from empirical studies. First, higher-
productivity firms are more likely to be formal, large, pay high wages and participate in
international trade (Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Tybout, 2000; Perry et al., 2007), whereas
lower-productivity firms are more likely to be informal, smaller, compensate workers with
lower wages and earn less profits than their formal counterparts (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008;
Dabla-Norris et al., 2008; McKenzie and Sakho, 2010; de Paula and Scheinkman, 2011).
Second, trade liberalization ambiguously affects formal sector employment and leads to
a decrease of informal sector employment, but the effect on total employment is ambiguous.
This result derives not just from export selection and firm exit, both well known from Melitz
(2003), but a new adjustment mechanism - the informalization of firms. Intuitively, trade
liberalization induces the selection of high-productivity formal firms into exporting and hiring
more workers. With trade liberalization, competitive pressure in the market rises and the
demand for each firm’s product falls. Lower-productivity formal firms switch to informal
production to remain profitable, and accordingly shed labor. Depending on the characteristics
of the economy, such as firm registration costs, the additional hires by exporting firms may
or may not compensate for the labor shedding in the formal sector. The lowest-productivity
informal firms are forced to exit the market, resulting in a reduction in informal sector
2Another common view sees informality as a last resort of business-owners waiting for formal employment.
Bruhn (2013) provides evidence for the coexistence of both types of informal businesses. Given the firm-level
focus, the model covers the entrepreneurial segment corresponding to the findings of e.g. Maloney (2004),
Ousman and Hallward-Driemeier (2012) and de Mel et al. (2013).
3Labor market frictions arising from fair wage preferences can empirically be shown through the existence
of wage curves (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1995). Several empirical studies find wage curves for informal and
formal salaried workers (Bucheli and Gonza´lez, 2007; Ramos et al., 2010; Baltagi et al., 2013), which indicates
fair wage expectations of workers in both sectors. Moreover, as surveyed by Zenou (2008), informal workers are
commonly employed by friends and relatives and therefore search frictions are often negligible in the informal
sector. Hence, the fair wage specification, opposed to the search-and-matching framework, is suitable to model
wage formation in both the informal and formal sector.
4Alternatively, informal employment is seen as voluntary choice. Current empirical evidence indicates a
dual structure in the labor market, where a share of workers is excluded from formal employment and another
share voluntarily chooses informal employment (Gu¨nther and Launov, 2012). Given that workers are salaried
workers, the model corresponds to the exclusion view.
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employment. The net effect on total employment is ambiguous. Therefore, the model provides
an explanation for a decrease in informal sector employment amidst conflicting empirical
evidence (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003; Fiess and Fugazza, 2012; McCaig and Pavcnik, 2012).
Additionally, the result corresponds to the ambiguous findings on the impact of trade on
unemployment (Davidson and Matusz, 2009; Dutt et al., 2009; Felbermayr et al., 2011b;
Menezes-Filho and Muendler, 2011).
Third, the effect of trade liberalization on aggregate output, and hence welfare, is ambigu-
ous. Similar to the employment effect, the increase in aggregate output by shifting resources
towards the highest-productivity exporting firms may or may not compensate for the loss
in aggregate output due to the exit of the least-productive informal firms and the informal-
ization of the least-productive formal firms. Therefore, the existence of an informal sector
distorts the resource allocation process, found for example by Bruhn (2013), and trade lib-
eralization can either alleviate (McCaig and Pavcnik, 2013) or aggravate the distortion by
affecting informal sector participation. This result is particularly interesting, as it stands
in contrast to the clear increase in welfare predicted by Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) and
commonly established in the theoretical literature on trade and heterogeneous firms.
Lastly, wage inequality is caused by a wage gap between informal and formal workers,
a frequent result in the empirical literature (de Paula and Scheinkman, 2011; Bargain and
Kwenda, 2011; Gu¨nther and Launov, 2012), and is employment-based. Openness to trade
increases wage inequality between informal and formal workers. Because of the reduction in
informal sector employment and sector switching, the increase of the informal sector average
wage is lower than the increase in formal sector average wage. Hence, the average wages of
both sectors diverge and between-group wage inequality increases. Wage inequality among all
employed workers is ambiguously affected through the above employment effect and depends
on the proportion of formal sector firms prior to trade liberalization.
This paper contributes to the literature on trade models featuring heterogeneous firms
and labor market frictions, and models of the informal economy. There exist two groups of
trade models with labor market frictions: In the first set of papers the labor market imper-
fections arise from a search-and-matching setup (Helpman and Itskhoki, 2010; Felbermayr
et al., 2011a). The second group of models builds on fair wage specifications (Egger and
Kreickemeier, 2009; Davis and Harrigan, 2011; Amiti and Davis, 2012). These models readily
address and explain the labor market concerns arising from trade liberalization and corre-
spond to a wide range of empirical facts with regard to the formal economy. However, they
do not consider the possibility of an informal sector and they therefore overlook a potentially
crucial determinant of resource allocation and wage dispersion among firms.
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Models of the informal economy have a long history. Fields (1975) uses a Harris-Todaro-
type model to analyze unemployment, whereas Rauch (1991) provides a rationale for size-
dualism with large formal and small informal firms. Loayza (1996) examines the interaction
of tax evasion and public good congestion. Wage dualism between formal and informal
workers is explained by Basu et al. (2011). While these models extend the understanding of
informality in various dimensions, their assumptions of an open economy preclude an explicit
analysis of how informality may affect the transition of an economy from autarky to trade
liberalization.
The major contribution of this paper therefore is to combine both informality and trade
in a heterogeneous firm setting, which few papers have sought to do. To my knowledge,
only two studies to date, Aleman-Castilla (2006) and Paz (2014), have considered this. Both
feature a labor market perspective by defining informality as payroll tax evasion and assume
that informal firms are prevented from exporting. In Aleman-Castilla (2006) there are no
labor market frictions and therefore the model features full employment with one equilibrium
wage for all workers. Alternatively, Paz (2014) features labor market imperfections using
an efficiency wage framework in a model where firms draw both productivity and ability
to monitor their workers. The model presented in this paper extends previous research in
several ways. First, by defining informality as firm registration non-compliance, the model
complements the two previous works that focus on labor market regulations as causes of
informality. Second, my model rests on the parsimonious assumption that the only source of
heterogeneity stems from firm productivity differences, yet captures a wide range of empirical
findings. Third, this model provides a more comprehensive picture than previous research
by featuring indicators for employment, welfare and wage inequality in one framework and
gives a rationale for unemployment as well as size and wage dualism. Fourth, the exclusion
of informal firms from international trade is a result of the model rather than an assumption,
which makes the model more realistic than its counterparts. Therefore, this model provides
a new perspective on the impact of trade in the presence of informality and, given its wide
scope, has important policy implications.
I proceed as follows. Section 2 characterizes the closed economy specification of the
model. Section 3 extends the model to an open economy and discusses the impact of trade
liberalization. Section 4 concludes the paper.
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2 The closed economy model
The economy consists of L units of labor, the only factor of production. There are two types
of goods: a final output and intermediate goods. The final output is homogeneous and its
market is in perfect competition. The intermediate goods are differentiated and produced
under monopolistic competition by a mass of heterogeneous firms (Melitz, 2003; Melitz and
Redding, 2013).
2.1 The final output
The final output Y is an aggregate of all intermediate goods and is characterized by the
following CES-production function (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003):5
Y =
[
M−(1−ρ)
∫
v∈V
q(v)ρdv
] 1
ρ
, 0 < ρ < 1. (1)
Intermediate good varieties are indexed with v and V is the set representing the mass of
available intermediate goods M . q(v) and p(v) are the quantity and the price of variety v.
σ ≡ 11−ρ is the elasticity of substitution between the varieties of intermediate goods. The
final output market is under perfect competition and the final output acts as numeraire. The
resulting CES-price index P is thus normalized to 1. The price index is described by
P =
[
M−1
∫
v∈V
p(v)1−σdv
] 1
1−σ
. (2)
Through profit maximization of the producer of the final good, the demand for variety v
of the intermediate good is
q(v) =
Y
M
p(v)−σ. (3)
2.2 The intermediate goods: informal and formal sector
The intermediate goods are produced under monopolistic competition by firms in two sectors:
an informal and a formal sector. Henceforth all informal sector variables feature subscript i
5This CES-specification ensures that the unemployment rate is independent of the size of the economy,
as there is no evidence on the correlation between the two, and prevents an increase in aggregate output due
to an increase in the number of input varieties. If, for example, equal amounts of every input q(v) = q
M
were
to be used in the final good production process, the production function would imply Y = q. External scale
effects are well understood from previous literature, e.g. Ethier (1982), and through the specification the focus
lies purely on the selection effect of trade liberalization.
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and formal sector variables subscript f . The firms are heterogeneous in their productivity
and every firm produces one unique variety of input for the final output production. Hence,
M can interchangeably be used to account for the number of firms or total number of input
varieties v. M = Mi +Mf is the number of domestically active firms, which consists of all
informal sector firms,Mi, and formal sector firms,Mf . Firms face fixed costs of production in
terms of final output Y and variable costs that are directly related to the firm’s productivity
ϕ. Firm output is linear in labor input l and productivity ϕ, that is q = ϕl. Firms with the
same productivity behave in the same manner. Therefore, I henceforth index firms solely in
terms of their productivity ϕ.
Firms voluntarily choose to become either informal or formal producers. Informal pro-
ducers face fixed cost fi and formal producers face ff to start production. I assume ff > fi,
as the formal fixed cost reflects complex firm registration and red tape (Djankov et al., 2002;
Auriol and Warlters, 2005; Antunes and de V. Cavalcanti, 2007). As unregistered firms, in-
formal firms are deprived of access to public goods and face a probability of detection δ by
the authorities, which leads to the total loss of firm revenues.6 The probability of audit and
detection is a reflection of the institutional quality of the economy (Loayza, 1996; Cebula,
1997; Dabla-Norris et al., 2008). As a result of formal sector participation, formal firms
experience a productivity bonus λ ∈ [0, 1) , which can be imagined as the result of access
to public goods and rule of law (de Soto, 1989; La Porta and Shleifer, 2008; Dabla-Norris
et al., 2008). Formal sector productivity is then described by ϕ1−λ and λ is assumed to be
exogenously given.
The profit maximizing price of both types of firms is a constant markup 1
ρ
over marginal
cost, where w(ϕ) denotes the wage paid by a firm with productivity ϕ and ǫ is the effort level
of workers.
pi(ϕ) =
wi(ϕ)
(1− δ)ρϕǫ
and pf (ϕ) =
wf (ϕ)
ρ ϕ1−λǫ
. (4)
In combination, demand for the individual input variety (3) and the profit-maximizing
price (4) lead to the informal and formal revenues
ri(ϕ) =
Y
M
(
wi(ϕ)
(1− δ)ρϕǫ
)1−σ
and rf (ϕ) =
Y
M
(
wf (ϕ)
ρ ϕ1−λǫ
)1−σ
, (5)
6While occurring at the same time in the model, intuitively a firm has to first pay the fixed cost to
start production and only then earns revenue. Government enforcement only comes into play once the entry
costs are sunk and the firm is meanwhile generating revenue. Hence, enforcement leads to a loss of revenue
independent of the fixed cost.
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and profits
πi(ϕ) = (1− δ)
σ Y
σM
(
wi(ϕ)
ρϕǫ
)1−σ
− fi and πf (ϕ) =
Y
σM
(
wf (ϕ)
ρ ϕ1−λǫ
)1−σ
− ff , (6)
which can be concave or convex in productivity depending on whether ξ− 1 < 0 or ξ− 1 > 0
holds. ξ is defined as ξ ≡ (1 − σ)(θ − 1). Besides firm productivity and fair wages, firm
revenue depends on two factors. First, the number of firms operating in the domestic market
M (and hence the number of varieties sold in the domestic market) influence the demand
for each individual variety. A strong domestic competition (thus, a high M) reduces the
demand for each variety and therefore the profitability of each firm’s operation. Second, the
demand for each firm’s variety rises with the aggregate revenue in the economy (here Y , as
P is normalized to 1).
2.3 The labor market and wage determination with informality
There are three groups of workers: informal workers Li, formal workers Lf and unemployed
workers Lu. Together they make up the total labor force in the economy L ≡ Li+Lf+Lu. The
informal sector employment share, formal sector employment share and share of unemployed
workers are described by Ei = (Li/L), Ef = (Lf/L) and U = (Lu/L). E ≡ Ei + Ef is the
fraction of employed workers.
Workers are identical and have a preference for fair wages along the lines of Akerlof and
Yellen (1990). As workers are identical, they are randomly selected by employers in the hiring
process and can become either informal or formal salaried workers or remain unemployed.
Therefore, I distinguish the informal sector average wage w¯i from the formal sector average
wage w¯f . The average wages are calculated as follows. The wage bill of the informal sector
Wi, i.e. the sum of all wages wi(ϕ) paid in the informal sector, is divided by the amount
of informal employment Li. This provides the informal sector average wage w¯i = (Wi/Li).
The calculation of the formal sector average wage follows the same procedure. To take the
potential unemployment into account, the average wage income per worker in the economy
(Eiw¯i + Ef w¯f ) consists of the two average wages weighted by the respective employment
shares, that is:
Eiw¯i + Ef w¯f =
Wi +Wf
L
. (7)
The reference wage of workers consists of two parts: a firm-internal and a firm-external
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factor (Howitt, 2002; Bewley, 2005; Danthine and Kurmann, 2007). The firm-internal com-
ponent captures the economic success of the firm as measured by the firm’s productivity ϕ.
When hired by a formal firm, workers are aware of the formal sector productivity bonus and
take the firm’s effective productivity ϕ1−λ into account. In line with Kreickemeier and Nelson
(2006), the firm-external component relates to the labor market and is the outside option of
workers. The external reference point is therefore described by the average wage income per
worker (Eiw¯i + Ef w¯f ).
The workers’ fairness consideration between firm-internal and -external reference points
is a geometric average weighted by the fairness parameter θ ∈ (0, 1).7 Through the firm-
internal component that relates the wage to firm productivity, the fair wage setup induces
heterogeneous wages among workers that are identical before the hiring process. The informal
and formal reference wages take the following functional form:
wˆi(ϕ) = ϕ
θ(Eiw¯i + Ef w¯f )
1−θ and wˆf (ϕ) =
(
ϕ
1− λ
)θ
(Eiw¯i + Ef w¯f )
1−θ. (8)
Workers exert effort level ǫ relative to what they perceive to be a fair wage wˆ. For
w(ϕ) ≥ wˆ workers effort their maximum effort level ǫ = 1, that is ǫ = min {w(ϕ)/wˆ, 1}.
Additionally, I assume that worker effort level ǫ cannot be contracted and the only mechanism
to induce effort is a wage offer. Therefore, outside workers are not able to underbid the wage of
currently employed workers, all firms pay the firm-specific reference wage wˆ and all employed
workers exert effort ǫ = 1.8 This is supported by the experimental evidence of Fehr and
Falk (1999), who show that worker effort level is positively related to their wage and that
employers are not interested in wage underbidding by outside workers in a world of incomplete
contracts. With all employed workers exerting full effort ǫ = 1, I henceforth ignore ǫ.
The presence of two sectors leads to two crucial differences of this model’s wages to
the wage specification of Egger and Kreickemeier (2009). First, the firm-external reference
point depends on both informal and formal sector wages. Due to the random selection of
workers, both employment types are viable options for workers. Second, workers are aware
of the productivity bonus that formal sector firms experience and adjust their firm-internal
reference point accordingly. This is supported by de Paula and Scheinkman (2011), who
find that formal firm status is correlated with higher wages even after controlling for firm
7For θ = 0, all firms would pay the average wage income per worker in the economy and wage adjustment
would lead to full employment similar to Melitz (2003) and the special case of θ = 0 in Egger and Kreickemeier
(2009).
8If an outsider were to be hired for a lower wage, she would adjust her reference wage wˆ and, given the
wage below reference level, decrease her effort level accordingly. Therefore, in equilibrium wage underbidding
is not attractive to firms.
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characteristics.
2.4 The firm’s decision to enter the informal or formal sector
A firm’s decision to become informal or formal is established as follows. Before the start of
operation, the firm pays a fixed cost fe and draws a productivity ϕ, a mechanism explained
in detail in subsection 2.6. A firm’s productivity influences its variable costs but not the
fixed cost it faces for entering either the informal or formal sector. Having full informa-
tion over entry costs and productivity bonus accruing to formal production, firms choose
the sector in which they can produce the most profitable or do not produce at all, that is
max {πi(ϕ), πf (ϕ), 0}.
9 Without further specification there are three ways informal and for-
mal firms may be distributed over the productivity spectrum. First, informal firms could be
the lowest-productivity firms in an economy and formal firms could be characterized by high-
productivity levels. Second, formal firms could be low-productivity firms and informal firms
could be found in the high-productivity spectrum. Lastly, informal and formal firms could
be distributed all over the spectrum without any distinct pattern. Given empirical evidence
on the productivity of informal sector firms, I assume the first case of low-productivity infor-
mal firms (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008; Dabla-Norris et al., 2008; de Paula and Scheinkman,
2011). That is ϕ∗f > ϕ
∗
i , where ϕ
∗
i and ϕ
∗
f are the cutoff productivity levels at which informal
and formal firms start profitably operating. The relationship between the benefits and costs
to achieve this sorting are summarized in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1. If [1− δ]
σ
ξ < 11−λ <
[
ff
fi
(1− δ)σ
] 1
ξ
, then formal sector firms are higher-
productivity firms than informal sector firms; that is ϕ∗f > ϕ
∗
i .
The sorting of sectors along the productivity spectrum according to Proposition 1 can
be seen in Figure 1. The drivers of this sorting are the formal sector productivity bonus
λ, the sector entry costs fi and ff as well as the enforcement parameter δ that steer the
profitability of production in both sectors. Intuitively, the formal productivity bonus has to
outweigh the cost of informal enforcement to make formal sector participation economically
viable. However, the bonus cannot be bigger than the relative formal sector entry cost,
which induces only high-productivity firms to enter formal production. Accordingly, informal
firms break even at a lower productivity level than formal firms do.10 Additionally, the
marginal profitability in terms of productivity of the informal sector is lower than the marginal
9This is a reflection of the entrepreneurial view on informal firms (Maloney, 2004; Ousman and Hallward-
Driemeier, 2012; de Mel et al., 2013).
10Breaking even at a lower productivity requires that ϕ∗i < ϕ
∗
f for ϕ
∗
i from pii(ϕ
∗
i ) = 0 & ϕ
∗
f from pif (ϕ
∗
f ) = 0.
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Figure 1: Sector sorting along the productivity spectrum according to Proposition 1.
profitability of the formal sector,11 that is, for high-productivity levels the profitability of the
formal sector is above the profitability of the informal sector.12 As both profit functions are
monotonically increasing in productivity, a single-crossing of the two functions is guaranteed
and only formal sector firms can be found at higher productivity levels. This is also consistent
with the empirical evidence that formal firm profits are higher than informal firm profits
(McKenzie and Sakho, 2010; de Paula and Scheinkman, 2011; Fajnzylber et al., 2011; de Mel
et al., 2013). As a result, ϕ∗i and ϕ
∗
f are determined by the following two conditions:
πi(ϕ
∗
i ) = 0 (9)
and
πf (ϕ
∗
f ) = πi(ϕ
∗
f ). (10)
From equation (6): ϕ∗i =
[
fi
(1−δ)σ
σM
Y
] 1
ξ
(Eiw¯i + Ef w¯f )ρ
1
θ−1 and
ϕ∗f =
[
ff
σM
Y
] 1
ξ (Eiw¯i + Ef w¯f )ρ
1
θ−1 (1− λ). Hence, 1
1−λ
<
[
ff
fi
(1− δ)σ
] 1
ξ
.
11This requires ∂pii
∂ϕ
<
∂pif
∂ϕ
. From equation (6):
∂pii
∂ϕ
= (1−δ)σξ Y
σM
{
(Eiw¯i + Ef w¯f )
1−θρ−1
}1−σ
ϕξ−1 and
∂pif
∂ϕ
= ξ Y
σM
{
(1− λ)1−θ(Eiw¯i + Ef w¯f )
1−θρ−1
}1−σ
ϕξ−1.
Hence, [1− δ]
σ
ξ < 1
1−λ
.
12The two conditions jointly are [1− δ]
σ
ξ < 1
1−λ
<
[
ff
fi
(1− δ)σ
] 1
ξ
and in combination ensure ϕ∗f > ϕ
∗
i as
illustrated in Figure 1.
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2.5 Firm-specific variables
The relative difference between any two firms can entirely be described by their productivity
ϕ, government enforcement δ, the formal sector productivity bonus λ and their resulting
formality status. Given that the result of Proposition 1 holds, the model parsimoniously
captures the findings of the empirical literature. To begin with, using (8) and (4) results in
wi(ϕi)
wf (ϕf )
=
(
ϕi
ϕf
)θ
(1− λ)θ < 1 and
pi(ϕi)
pf (ϕf )
=
(
ϕi
ϕf
)θ−1
(1− λ)θ−1(1− δ)−1 > 1. (11)
This highlights the firm-specificity of wages and the difference between wages in the two
sectors. Consistent with the empirical literature, informal wages are lower than formal wages
for two reasons. First, wages are a function of firm productivity and formal sector firms
are high-productivity firms. Second, the formal sector productivity bonus acts as a wage
premium for formal sector employment. This results in a informal wage gap, as commonly
found in the empirical literature (de Paula and Scheinkman, 2011; Bargain and Kwenda,
2011; Gu¨nther and Launov, 2012). Similarly, (11) allows for a comparison of the relative
prices pi(ϕi)/pf (ϕf ), and shows that formal firms charge lower prices than informal firms.
Intuitively, due to their productivity bonus and higher productivity level, formal firms are
able to translate lower marginal costs into lower prices for their products. This is in line with
the findings of Foster et al. (2008), who show a negative correlation between physical firm
productivity and output prices. Moreover, higher enforcement, as a driver of informal sector
production costs, translates into higher prices charged by informal producers. In addition,
using (3) and (5), I can compare the quantities and revenues between firms of the two sectors.
qi(ϕi)
qf (ϕf )
=
(
ϕi
ϕf
)σ(1−θ)
(1− λ)σ(1−θ)(1− δ)σ < 1 and
ri(ϕi)
rf (ϕf )
=
(
ϕi
ϕf
)ξ
(1− λ)ξ(1− δ)σ−1 < 1. (12)
Formal firms are not just able to translate higher productivity into lower prices, but they
also produce larger quantities than their informal counterparts, as found by La Porta and
Shleifer (2008).13 In combination, the revenue of firms in the formal sector is higher than in
13La Porta and Shleifer (2011) also suggest that informal firms produce lower-quality products than their
formal counterparts. In the model, firms produce symmetric varieties at different costs. As mentioned in
Melitz (2003), an alternative interpretation of productivity in Melitz (2003)-type models is that firms produce
12
the informal sector. This corresponds to the empirical findings of Fajnzylber et al. (2011).
Furthermore, (13) illustrates the labor demand of an informal sector firm li(ϕ) relative to the
labor demand of a formal sector firm lf (ϕ).
li(ϕi)
lf (ϕf )
=
(
ϕi
ϕf
)σ(1−θ)−1
(1− δ)σ(1− λ)σ(1−θ)−1 < 1. (13)
To capture the positive correlation between productivity level and employment, that is
li(ϕ) < lf (ϕ), I assume σ(1−θ)−1 > 0, analogous to Egger and Kreickemeier (2009). In this
setup the assumption is relevant for another reason. Given this assumption, informal firms
hire less labor than formal firms due to the productivity bonus of formal sector firms found by
La Porta and Shleifer (2008), de Paula and Scheinkman (2011) and Fajnzylber et al. (2011).
Moreover, high-productivity firms pay not just higher wages, but also hire more workers, in
line with the literature on firm size wage premiums (Brown and Medoff, 1989). Using the
zero profit conditions for both sectors (9) and (10), I can specify the distance of informal to
formal sector cutoff productivity level relative to the formal sector cutoff productivity level
ϕ∗f−ϕ
∗
i
ϕ∗
f
.
ϕ∗f − ϕ
∗
i
ϕ∗f
= 1−
(
fi
ff − fi
) 1
ξ (
(1− λ)−ξ − (1− δ)σ
) 1
ξ
(1− δ)
−σ
ξ . (14)
This allows the analysis of inter-firm productivity differences between the marginal in-
formal and the marginal formal firm with regard to policy changes and is summarized in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. The relative productivity distance of formal to informal sector firms
ϕ∗f−ϕ
∗
i
ϕ∗
f
is decreasing in fi, δ and λ and increasing in ff .
Proof. See appendix A.
The intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows. An increase in factors that make informal
sector participation more costly (fi, δ) or factors that make formal sector production more
profitable (λ) raises the informal sector productivity cutoff level ϕ∗i relative to the formal
sector productivity cutoff level ϕ∗f and thereby diminishes the distance in relative productivity
levels. The distance in relative productivity levels increases for an increase in the formal sector
entry cost ff through a reduction in the profitability of formal sector participation.
varieties of different quality at the same cost. Given this interpretation, the model implicitly reflects the lower
quality of informal sector products. Verhoogen (2008) models product quality explicitly, albeit does so using
heterogeneous workers.
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2.6 Firm productivity distribution and free entry
Firms are indexed by their productivity ϕ, hence firm size distribution, aggregate employment
and aggregate output of the economy hinge on the productivity distribution. A commonly
used distribution in Melitz (2003)-type models is the Pareto distribution. It is both tractable
and fits empirical findings on firm size and the productivity distribution well (Axtell, 2001;
Helpman et al., 2004). The distribution is given by G(ϕ) with density g(ϕ) and shape
parameter k > ξ.14 The lower bound of productivities is normalized to 1.
G(ϕ) = 1− ϕ−k and g(ϕ) = kϕ−(k+1). (15)
In a manner well known from Melitz (2003), I assume an unbounded mass of prospective
entrants, all identical ex-ante, to the intermediate sector. Entering entails a fixed cost of
fe > 0 and allows firms to draw a productivity ϕ from the distribution G(ϕ). Firms only
start producing if the expected profit of production is non-negative. In equilibrium the
average profit of active firms, conditional on successful market entry, is equal to the sunk
cost fe. This is described by the free entry condition:
∫ ϕ∗f
ϕ∗i
πi(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
G(ϕ∗f )−G(ϕ
∗
i )
+
∫∞
ϕ∗
f
πf (ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
1−G(ϕ∗f )
= fe. (16)
Using the cutoff productivity levels and wage equations for both sectors, I can describe
(7), the average wage income per worker in the economy, as
Eiw¯i + Ef w¯f = L
−1
[∫ ϕ∗f
ϕ∗i
li(ϕ)wi(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
f
lf (ϕ)wf (ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
]
. (17)
As firms price their goods with a constant markup 1/ρ over marginal costs, the wage
income of employed workers is equal to a constant share of output (Eiw¯i +Ef w¯f )L = ρY .
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Through (16), the expected profits of all firms equal their initial investment fe. Therefore,
14A Pareto distributions has a finite mean only if its shape parameter k > 1. Productivity is Pareto
distributed and labor as well as revenue are power functions of productivity. Therefore, also firm size and
revenue are Pareto distributed. For the distributions of firm size and revenue to have a finite mean, k
ξ−θ
> 1
and k
ξ
> 1, respectively, have to hold. Thus, as in Egger and Kreickemeier (2009), k > ξ is assumed.
15The aggregate revenue in the economy is described by Y , because P = 1. It consists of both the firms’ and
the workers’ share of the aggregate revenue. Due to the monopolistic competition assumption and resulting
prices characterized by a constant markup 1/ρ over marginal costs, the shares are constant proportions. A
constant fraction 1/σ of the firm revenue accrues to the firm and (σ − 1)/σ = ρ accrues to the workers of the
firm. Hence, the wage income of all employed workers (Eiw¯i + Ef w¯f )L has to equal their constant share of
the aggregate revenue ρY .
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the workers’ income is the only disposable income for consumption and a natural utilitarian
measure for welfare, as in Egger and Kreickemeier (2009), and can be written as:
Y
L
=
(Eiw¯i + Ef w¯f )
ρ
. (18)
2.7 Employment
The share of employment in the economy consists of two parts: informal sector employment
share Ei and formal sector employment share Ef . Building on the condition of Proposition
1, the employment share can be written as
E = Ei + Ef = L
−1
[∫ ϕ∗f
ϕ∗i
li(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
f
lf (ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
]
. (19)
Next, I examine the relative employment share (Ei/Ef ) to determine the effect of policy
changes.
Ei
Ef
= (1− δ)σ(1− λ)χ+k
[(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗f
)χ
− 1
]
, (20)
where χ ≡ σ(1− θ)− k − 1 < 0.16
Proposition 3. The ratio of informal employment share to formal employment share Ei
Ef
is
increasing in ff and decreasing in fi, δ, λ.
Proof. See appendix B.
Proposition 3 and Proposition 2 jointly shed light on the mechanics of the economy. A
reduction in informal sector profitability or increase in formal sector profitability (i.e. increase
in fi, δ and λ) leads to a decrease in relative productivity distance and a decrease in informal
sector employment relative to formal sector employment. Similarly, a decrease in formal sector
profitability (i.e. increase in ff ) increases the relative productivity distance and increases
relative informal sector employment. Intuitively, reducing informal sector profitability or
increasing formal sector profitability drives the least-productive informal sector firms out
of the market. As a result, the informal sector sheds labor and informal sector average
productivity increases. This extends Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) to a new adjustment
margin. Informal and formal sector employment are affected differently by changes in the
16k > ξ is assumed. This implies σ(1− θ)− k − 1 + θ < 0 and thus σ(1− θ)− k − 1 < 0.
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economy. The employment effect of one sector can buffer the employment effect of the other
one.
The setup of this model in combination with the aforementioned propositions capture
the major stylized facts emerging from the empirical literature on the informal sector. First,
informal sector firms hire less workers, pay a lower wage and are described by lower produc-
tivity. (Perry et al., 2007; La Porta and Shleifer, 2008). By contrast, higher-productivity
firms hire more workers, pay a higher compensation for the work and are more likely to
be part of the formal sector (Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Perry et al., 2007). The empirical
literature classically states low government enforcement and high firm registration costs as
main drivers of informal sector participation (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Djankov et al.,
2002; Auriol and Warlters, 2005; Dabla-Norris and Inchauste, 2008). The model replicates
this finding, as lower enforcement δ and higher fixed cost ff lead to higher informal sector
employment relative to formal sector employment.
2.8 Wage inequality
Prior to the hiring process workers are identical and subsequently can be employed in either
the informal or formal sector. Additionally, wages in this model are firm-specific. Therefore,
two types of wage inequality can be disentangled. First, given the productivity difference
between the two sectors and the informal sector wage gap, I consider the wage inequality
between informal and formal workers. Second, as all workers are identical in skill level, I ana-
lyze wage inequality among all employed workers similar in spirit to Egger and Kreickemeier
(2012).
The measure of between-group wage inequality is the ratio of the formal sector average
wage relative to the informal sector average wage:
w¯f
w¯i
= (1− λ)−θ
[
1−
(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗f
)χ]1−
(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗f
)ξ−k
−1
> 1. (21)
As formal production entails a productivity bonus and is characterized by high-productivity
firms, the average wage in the formal sector is higher than in the informal sector and the
ratio is strictly greater than one.
Second, I measure the wage inequality among all employed workers using the Gini-
coefficient. Calculating the Gini-coefficient for the two-sector economy requires two steps.
First, I calculate the Lorenz curve Q(γ) by relating the share of employment to the share
of wage bill for firms with productivity below ϕ¯ ∈ [ϕ∗i ,∞]. Because employment and wages
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in the informal sector differ from the formal sector, the Lorenz curve consists of two seg-
ments and requires lengthy calculations that can be found in appendix C. Second, the
Gini-coefficient G(a), where subscript (a) stands for autarky, follows from the Lorenz curve
through G(a) = 1− 2
∫ 1
0 Q(γ)dγ. G(a) is then described by
G(a) = Gf

1 + 2
(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗
f
)k−ξ
θΓ∆

χ

Υ− Ξ
(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗f
)θ
+ [Ξ−Υ]
(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗f
)−χ
+θΥ
[
1−
(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗f
)−χ]}]
, (22)
where Gf ≡
θ
θ−2(ξ−k) ,
17 Γ ≡ (1− δ)σ −
[
(1− δ)σ − (1− λ)−ξ+θ
] (ϕ∗i
ϕ∗
f
)−χ
, ∆ ≡ (1− δ)σ −[
(1− δ)σ − (1− λ)−ξ
] (ϕ∗i
ϕ∗
f
)k−ξ
, Υ ≡ (1− δ)2σ − (1− δ)σ(1− λ)−ξ and Ξ ≡ (1− δ)2σ − (1−
δ)σ(1− λ)−ξ+θ. The Gini-coefficient in the two-sector economy G(a) depends on the ratio of
the two cutoff productivity levels (ϕ∗i /ϕ
∗
f ), which is a proxy for the relative sector size. For
the extreme cases of (ϕ∗i /ϕ
∗
f ) = 1, i.e. all firms are formal, and (ϕ
∗
i /ϕ
∗
f ) = 0, i.e. all firms are
informal, the specification collapses to the single-sector economy Gini-coefficient Gf . In the
two-sector economy, that is (ϕ∗i /ϕ
∗
f ) ∈ (0, 1), G(a) > Gf holds and the wage distribution is
more unequal than in the single-sector economy. Moreover, for θ ∈ (0, 1), i.e. workers value
firm-specific wages, the Gini-coefficient is strictly greater than 0.18
3 The open economy
To explore how the presence of an informal sector may mediate the impact of trade liber-
alization, I extend the closed economy specification by adding international trade with n
symmetric countries. The symmetry assumption allows me to focus on firm-level effects and
renders country indices obsolete. Moreover, a world in which every country is characterized
by sector dualism is sensible, since informality is a global phenomenon (Schneider et al.,
2010). Two types of costs are distinguished for firms participating in international trade. As
has been empirically shown by Roberts and Tybout (1997), sunk costs of exporting critically
17Gf is the Gini-coefficient of a purely-formal or purely-informal economy. This result is derived in appendix
C.
18For the extreme case of θ = 0, i.e. all workers receive the same wage, Gf = 0 and the economy would be
perfectly equal.
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determine export participation. Firms have to cover a fixed exporting cost fx > ff , in addi-
tion to the domestic entry cost, to participate in trade. The fixed cost fx can be interpreted
as a one-time expense for knowledge or infrastructure needed to engage in international trade
and allows firms to access all n markets. Subscript x is used henceforth to describe variables
related to export activities. In addition, firms face a variable trade cost that is modeled in
the form of an iceberg trade cost τ > 1, i.e. for one unit to arrive at the destination market,
τ units have to be shipped (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004).
3.1 The firm’s decision to export
Given the previous constraint on informal firms being characterized by lower productivities
than formal firms, it is never profitable for informal firms to export.19 Intuitively, informal
firms decide against formality out of profitability considerations arising from the formal sector
fixed cost ff . Exporting induces an even higher fixed cost fx than the formal sector partic-
ipation already does. Hence, the same profitability considerations will lead informal sector
firms to not be able to profitably export. The complete exclusion of informal sector firms
from exporting is stylized. Yet, this model result is supported by the empirical literature
that finds that informal firms rarely export (Batra et al., 2003; Bigsten et al., 2004; La Porta
and Shleifer, 2008). The result is summarized in Proposition 4:
Proposition 4. If Proposition 1 holds, informal sector firms will never find it profitable to
export.
In regards to the formal sector, empirical studies find a clear correlation between export
participation and firm productivity, i.e. the highest-productivity firms in an economy self-
select into exporting (Bernard and Jensen, 1995; Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Delgado et al.,
2002; Wagner, 2007). Hence, the results focus on parameters that satisfy ϕ∗x > ϕ
∗
f , where ϕ
∗
x
stands for the cutoff productivity level at which exporting becomes profitable, and assumes
that exporters are characterized by a higher productivity level than non-exporters. Therefore
upon drawing a productivity ϕ, a firm in the open economy decides on its formality status
and export participation according to max {πi(ϕ), πf (ϕ), πf (ϕ) + πx(ϕ), 0}. The number of
firms operating in the domestic market then consists of informal sector firms and formal
19What is required for informal exporting to be profitable at a lower productivity level than formal export-
ing, i.e. ϕi < ϕf from pi
x
i (ϕi) = (1− δ)
σn Y
σM
{
ϕθ−1i (Eiw¯i + Ef w¯f )
1−θρ−1τ
}1−σ
− fx = 0 &
pixf (ϕf ) = n
Y
σM
{(
ϕf
1−λ
)θ−1
(Eiw¯i + Ef w¯f )
1−θρ−1τ
}1−σ
− fx = 0. The resulting requirement is
(1− δ)
σ
ξ > 1
1−λ
, which contradicts (1− δ)
σ
ξ < 1
1−λ
of Proposition 1.
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sector firms, which are domestic, as well as foreign exporters, i.e. M =Mi+Mf +(1+n)Mx.
The sufficient condition for the productivity sorting is summarized in Proposition 5:20
Proposition 5. If fxτ
ξ
1−θ
n(1−λ)−ξ
>
ff−fi
(1−λ)−ξ−(1−δ)σ
, then exporting firms are higher-productivity
firms than non-exporting formal sector firms; that is ϕ∗x > ϕ
∗
f .
The sorting depends on the entry costs to the informal and formal sector (fi and ff ),
informal sector enforcement (δ), formal sector productivity bonus (λ) and the variables de-
termining the costs and benefits of trade (fx, τ and n). Intuitively, the inequality compares
two cost-benefit ratios. If the cost-benefit ratio of exporting fxτ
ξ
1−θ
n(1−λ)−ξ
is higher than the cost-
benefit ratio of domestic production
ff−fi
(1−λ)−ξ−(1−δ)σ
, then a higher productivity is required to
be able to profit from exporting.
Given the variable and fixed cost, the formal sector firm revenue function is
r(ϕ) =

rf (ϕ) if the firm sells domestically,rf (ϕ) + nτ1−σrf (ϕ) if the firm exports. (23)
A firm’s profit from exporting is described by
πx(ϕ) =
rf (ϕ)nτ
1−σ
σ
− fx. (24)
In addition to (9) and (10), there is a new condition to determine the export participation
productivity cutoff level ϕ∗x
πx(ϕ
∗
x) = 0. (25)
In summary, to achieve the productivity sorting of firms in the open economy according
to the empirical literature, the model builds on the the results of Proposition 1, 4 and 5.
That is, informal sector firms are assumed to be the lowest-productivity firms followed by
domestic formal firms. Lastly, formal firms that export are the highest-productivity firms.
Given this, there are no informal sector exporters.
20Ensuring ϕ∗x > ϕ
∗
f for ϕ
∗
f from pii(ϕ
∗
f ) = pif (ϕ
∗
f ) and ϕ
∗
x from pix(ϕ
∗
x) = 0 is sufficient to sort domestic
productivity levels below export productivity levels. This results in
ϕ∗f =
[
(ff−fi)Mσ
Y ((1−λ)−ξ−(1−δ)σ)
] 1
ξ
(Eiw¯i + Ef w¯f )ρ
1
θ−1 and ϕ∗x =
[
fxnσM
Y
] 1
ξ (Eiw¯i + Ef w¯f )(
ρ
τ
)
1
θ−1 (1 − λ). In com-
bination, fxτ
ξ
1−θ
n(1−λ)−ξ
>
ff−fi
(1−λ)−ξ−(1−δ)σ
.
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3.2 Firm-specific variables
I can express the relationship between formal firms and formal exporting firms as ratios solely
in terms of their productivity levels, variable trade costs τ and the number of countries n,
independent of assumptions on the distribution of firm productivity. The price and quantities
refer solely to the export markets. However, the profits of exporting firms stem from both
domestic and foreign sales. Hence, the total labor demand and revenues of exporting firms
consist of both the ones for the domestic market and the export market. Exporters pay the
same wage as formal sector producers, i.e. wf (ϕ), and the model does not feature an explicit
exporter wage premium. Since exporters are assumed to be more productive than non-
exporting formal firms, wf (ϕ
∗
x) > wf (ϕ
∗
f ) holds. With the fair wages being power functions
of productivity, the productivity differential between exporters and non-exporters entails a
wage differential. As a result, the model captures the empirical observation that exporting
firms pay higher wages than non-exporting firms (Bernard and Jensen, 1995; Schank et al.,
2007).
pf (ϕf )
px(ϕx)
=
(
ϕf
ϕx
)θ−1
τ−1 < 1 and
qf (ϕf )
qx(ϕx)
=
(
ϕf
ϕx
)σ(1−θ)
τσ > 1. (26)
Given the same productivity, in foreign markets the price is higher and the quantity sold
is lower than in the domestic market.
rf (ϕf )
rx(ϕx)
=
(
ϕf
ϕx
)ξ 1
1 + nτ1−σ
< 1 and
lf (ϕf )
lx(ϕx)
=
(
ϕf
ϕx
)σ(1−θ)−1 1
1 + nτ1−σ
< 1. (27)
With regard to revenue and labor demand, both are increasing in the number of countries
n and decreasing in the variable trade cost τ for exporters relative to formal non-exporters.
These model results are in line with the commonly stated firm-level evidence on exporters
being characterized by higher employment and higher revenues than their non-exporting
counterparts (Bernard and Jensen, 1995; Bernard et al., 2012).
Equation (28) allows me to analyze the distance between formal sector productivity cutoff
ϕ∗f and exporting cutoff productivity level ϕ
∗
x relative to the exporting cutoff productivity
level ϕ∗x:
ϕ∗x − ϕ
∗
f
ϕ∗x
= 1−
(
(ff − fi)nτ
1−σ)
fx
) 1
ξ (
(1− λ)−ξ − (1− δ)σ
)−1
ξ
(1− λ)−1. (28)
The results are summarized in Proposition 6 and can be separated into two groups. First,
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the effects that make international trade more attractive to firms (increase in n or decrease in
fx or τ) close the relative distance between the productivities. A more open economy allows
for increased sales of exporting firms, directly benefiting their profitability, and decreases
the required productivity level for participation. For non-exporting formal sector firms, an
increased number of foreign competitors in the domestic market drives down profitability
and increases productivity requirements. The second group are factors that also influence
domestic firms directly. Factors increasing the profitability of formal sector participation
relative to informal sector participation (increase in fi, δ and λ) lower the productivity
threshold of becoming formal, but do not affect export participation as much. As a result,
the relative distance between exporting and domestic formal firms increases. The opposite
holds true for the formal sector entry cost ff . Formal sector participation is more affected
than export participation, as exporters are high-productivity firms, and the productivity
distance decreases.
Proposition 6. The relative distance in cutoff productivities
ϕ∗x−ϕ
∗
f
ϕ∗x
is decreasing in ff and
n. It is increasing in fi, fx, δ, λ and τ .
Proof. See appendix D.
Lastly, comparing ϕ∗x = (fx/fi)
1
ξ (nτ1−σ)
− 1
ξ (1− λ)(1− δ)
σ
ξ ϕ∗i , i.e. the cutoff productivity
level of the marginal informal sector and marginal exporting firms highlights what drives their
difference. The ratio of sector entry costs, trade variables and the productivity bonus lead to
a higher productivity requirement for exporting firms relative to informal sector producers.
Similar to the cutoff productivity levels, the difference between these key variables is driven
by potential government enforcement for informal sector firms, the productivity bonus of
formal sector firms and the trade parameters.
To derive the new free entry condition in the open economy, I extend (16) to include
potential exporting profit:
∫ ϕ∗f
ϕ∗i
πi(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
G(ϕ∗f )−G(ϕ
∗
i )
+
∫ ϕ∗x
ϕ∗
f
πf (ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
G(ϕ∗x)−G(ϕ
∗
f )
+
∫∞
ϕ∗x
[πf (ϕ) + πx(ϕ)] g(ϕ)dϕ
1−G(ϕ∗x)
= fe. (29)
3.3 Employment
I can rewrite the equilibrium employment in terms of the cutoff productivity levels. Em-
ployment in the economy consists of three segments: informal, formal and formal exporter
employment. The employment share in the economy then is
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E = L−1
[∫ ϕ∗f
ϕ∗i
li(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ϕ∗x
ϕ∗
f
lf (ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x
lx(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
]
. (30)
To analyze the impact of trade liberalization on employment, I first delineate the effect
into the employment of the informal and formal sectors. Formal sector employment adjusts
along two margins. The high-productivity formal firms become exporters and hire additional
workers to be able to serve the foreign demand. After trade liberalization, foreign competitors
enter the domestic market and more varieties of the intermediate good are sold domestically
(increase in M). As competitive pressure rises, the demand for each variety decreases and
the profitability of all firms is reduced. Low-productivity formal firms informalize to remain
profitable. As a result, formal sector employment is affected negatively, dampening total
employment. Informal sector firms do not experience the productivity bonus λ and thus hire
fewer workers than formal sector firms at the same productivity level. This is obvious when
comparing the labor demand ratio li(ϕ1)/lf (ϕ2) = (ϕ1/ϕ2)
σ(1−θ)−1 (1 − δ)σ(1 − λ)σ(1−θ)−1.
Whether the hiring effect of exporting firms or the labor shedding of informalized firms
dominates depends on the key characteristics of the economy. Thus, the effect of trade
liberalization on formal sector employment is ambiguous.
Informal sector employment is also affected along two margins. With falling demand for
each input variety, the lowest-productivity informal producers are forced out of the market
and release labor. Along the other margin, the least-productive formal sector firms become
informal and thereby increase informal sector employment. Given the Pareto productivity
distribution, the labor releasing effect is stronger than the labor hiring and therefore infor-
mal sector employment unambiguously decreases upon trade liberalization.21 The empirical
evidence on the adjustment of informal sector employment through trade liberalization is
ambiguous with a wide range of definitions of informality and data sets in use.22 My research
provides theoretical support for the finding of decreasing informal sector employment with
21 Ei(t)
Ei(a)
=
[
1 + n
(
fx
finτ
1−σ
)−k
ξ
(1− λ)−k(1− δ)
−kσ
ξ
]−θ
ξ

1 + (1−λ)−k(nτ1−σ)
k
ξ
(
fx
fi
) ξ−k
ξ (1−δ)
σ(ξ−k)
ξ
((1−λ)−ξ−(1−δ)σ)
k
ξ
(
fi
ff−fi
) k−ξ
ξ
(1−δ)
σ(ξ−k)
ξ +(1−δ)σ


θ
ξ
−1
,
where the subscript (a) and (t) stand for autarky and trade.
(
Ei(t)
Ei(a)
)
< 1 because − θ
ξ
< 0 and θ
ξ
− 1 < 0.
Hence, informal sector employment unambiguously decreases upon trade liberalization.
22My model focuses on firm-level informality as registration non-compliance. Thus, all workers employed
by a firm are either formal or informal workers. Defining informality from a labor market perspective, i.e. as
the evasion of labor market regulations, allows firms to hire both informal and formal workers by, for instance,
evading social security contributions for only some of their workers. As a consequence of trade liberalization
and increased competitive pressure, firms might substitute formal with informal workers, potentially leading
to an increase or no change in informal employment found by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003).
22
trade liberalization (Fiess and Fugazza, 2012; McCaig and Pavcnik, 2012).
Lastly, I analyze the total employment in the economy as a combination of the employment
adjustments of both sectors. As illustrated in Figure 2, liberalizing trade changes the position
of both sectors along the productivity distribution. Three forces determine the change in total
employment: an employment gain as a result of exporter hiring, an employment loss caused
by the informalization of the least-productive formal sector firms and an employment loss that
occurs as the least-productive informal sector firms exit the market. While the informal sector
unambiguously reduces its size, the effect of trade liberalization on formal sector employment
is ambiguous, thus rendering the total employment effect ambiguous. The magnitude of
each sectoral adjustment and accordingly the direction of total employment adjustment is
determined by the economy’s characteristics, such as entry costs to both sectors. The move
from autarky to full integration is stylized. The aforementioned results hold also for gradual
trade integration, as measured by a reduction in τ or fx.
23
Figure 2: Sector sorting along the productivity distribution in autarky and the open economy.
This highlights a key contribution of this model. In Egger and Kreickemeier (2009)
there are only two forces at work. The highest-productivity firms become exporters and hire
additional workers; the lowest-productivity firms exit the market and shed labor. In sum,
Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) find an unambiguous employment decrease. The existence
of an informal sector gives rise to a third force, i.e. the informalization of low-productivity
formal firms, which dampens the reallocation of labor towards more productive firms. The
economy’s characteristics affect the three forces and accordingly the magnitude of each. This
result, as summarized in Proposition 7, bridges the gap between the original model of Egger
23Proof for this is available from the author upon request.
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and Kreickemeier (2009) and the mixed empirical evidence on the relationship between trade
openness and unemployment (Davidson and Matusz, 2009; Dutt et al., 2009; Felbermayr
et al., 2011b; Menezes-Filho and Muendler, 2011).
Proposition 7. Trade liberalization reduces informal sector employment unambiguously and
can either reduce or increase formal sector employment. In combination, the effect of trade
liberalization on total employment in the economy is ambiguous in the presence of informality.
Proof. See appendix F.
To gain further insight into the mechanics of the model, analogously to the closed econ-
omy case, I can describe the informal sector employment share relative to the formal sector
employment share:
(
Ei
Ef
)
(t)
= η
(
Ei
Ef
)
(a)
, (31)
where η ≡
[
1 + nτ1−σ
(
ϕ∗f
ϕ∗x
)−χ]−1
< 1. Subscript (a) and (t) stand for autarky and trade.
The intuition follows from the earlier result. Informal sector employment unambiguously
decreases, while formal sector employment may either increase or decrease. In combination,
trade liberalization unambiguously reduces the informal sector employment share relative to
the formal sector share. This leads to Proposition 8:
Proposition 8. The ratio of informal employment share to formal employment share is lower
in the open economy than under autarky.
3.4 Welfare
The average wage income per worker (Eiw¯i+Ef w¯f ) in the open economy is described by all
three cutoff productivities and, in combination with (18), determines the aggregate output
in the open economy.
(Eiw¯i + Ef w¯f ) = L
−1
[∫ ϕ∗f
ϕ∗i
li(ϕ)wi(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ϕ∗x
ϕ∗
f
lf (ϕ)wf (ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
+
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x
lx(ϕ)wf (ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
]
. (32)
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The effect of trade liberalization on welfare, as measured by the aggregate output of
the economy per capita, is similar to the employment effect. The intuition is as follows.
Trade liberalization allows the highest-productivity firms to become exporters and shifts
resources towards the most-productive firms in the economy. Thereby aggregate formal sector
output is increased. The lowest-productivity formal firms, however, switch to informal sector
production. The result is a reduction in aggregate formal sector output through the loss of
the formal sector productivity bonus. In sum, the effect of trade on the aggregate formal
sector output is ambiguous. The informal sector is affected along two margins, as well. The
lowest-productivity informal sector firms cease production and decrease aggregate informal
sector output, while the informalization of the lowest-productivity formal firms increases the
aggregate output of the informal sector. Depending on the economy’s characteristics the
former may or may not compensate for the latter, rendering the effect on aggregate informal
sector output ambiguous. As before, depending on the key parameters of the economy, the
net effect of trade liberalization on the aggregate output of the whole economy can be positive
or negative. This result also holds for gradual trade liberalization (decrease in τ or fx).
24
The effect of trade on aggregate output in this model is more nuanced than in Egger and
Kreickemeier (2009), who find an unambiguous increase in aggregate output through trade
liberalization. The ambiguous result highlights the distortive effect of the informal sector
on resource allocation, as suggested by, for example, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Bruhn
(2013), that can either be alleviated (McCaig and Pavcnik, 2013) or aggravated through
trade. Proposition 9 summarizes this result.
Proposition 9. Trade liberalization in the presence of informality has an ambiguous effect
on the aggregate output of the informal sector, the formal sector and in sum on the welfare
of the economy.
Proof. See appendix F.
3.5 Wage inequality
Trade liberalization affects wage inequality indirectly by adjusting the number of workers
employed in the informal and formal sector.25 As before, I first analyze between-group wage
inequality.
24Proof for this is available from the author upon request.
25My model focuses on the interaction between the informal and formal sector and accordingly ignores an
exporter wage premium. The model can be extended to include a fair wage constraint that uses firm revenue
and not firm productivity as firm-internal reference point. This would lead to the exporter wage premium and
could provide another source for wage inequality, even among formal workers.
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(
w¯f
w¯i
)
(t)
= ω
(
w¯f
w¯i
)
(a)
, (33)
where ω ≡
[
1 + nτ1−σ
(
ϕ∗x
ϕ∗
f
)ξ−k] [
1 + nτ1−σ
(
ϕ∗x
ϕ∗
f
)χ]−1
> 1. Between-group wage in-
equality in the open economy is higher than under autarky. Intuitively, trade liberalization
raises the competitive pressure in the economy and forces the least-productive informal firms
to exit and the lowest-productivity formal firms to informalize. The informal firms paying
the lowest wages exit and higher-wage formal firms start informal production. This raises the
informal sector average wage. With regard to the formal sector, the highest-wage exporters
hire more workers and the lowest-wage formal firms informalize. The average wage of the
formal sector increases and does so at a greater magnitude than the informal sector average
wage. Hence, the average wages diverge and between-group inequality increases.
Similarly, wage inequality among all employed workers measured by the Gini-coefficient
hinges on the share of employment in both sectors. The derivation of the Gini- coefficient is
analogous to the closed economy, albeit more complicated.26 The Lorenz curve consists of
not just informal and formal workers, but also workers employed by exporting firms.27 Trade
liberalization affects wage inequality indirectly through the employment shares and can either
increase or decrease wage inequality. The intuition for this result derives from Proposition
8. Both a purely-formal and a purely-informal economy feature the same Gini-coefficient,
which is strictly lower than that of an economy featuring both sectors.28 Trade liberalization
increases the formal sector employment share relative to informal sector employment share. If
initially formal sector employment is large relative to informal sector employment, a relative
increase in the formal labor share pushes the economy closer to a purely-formal economy.
Hence, wage inequality decreases. The opposite holds true if the formal sector is relatively
small before trade trade liberalization. Due to the relative formalization of labor through
trade, the economy diverges from a purely-informal economy. Trade then increases wage
inequality.29
26Given its complicated nature, the Gini-coefficient for the open economy is derived in Appendix E.
27For the extreme case of (ϕ∗i /ϕ
∗
x) = 0, i.e. no firm exports, the open economy Gini-coefficient collapses
to the autarky specification. If in addition to that, (ϕ∗i /ϕ
∗
f ) = 0 or (ϕ
∗
i /ϕ
∗
f ) = 1 are imposed, the coefficient
further collapses to the formal-sector-only specification.
28For a derivation of this result, see Appendix C. As shown by Helpman et al. (2010), the Gini-coefficient
depends only on the shape parameter of the wage distribution, but not its lower limit. Both informal and
formal sector wage distribution feature the same shape parameter and thus the same inequality.
29The intuition here is similar to the effect of a conditional exporter wage premium on wage inequality, as
shown empirically by Helpman et al. (2012), Akerman et al. (2013), Baumgarten (2013) and theoretically by
Helpman et al. (2010). The findings suggest that a major share of overall wage inequality arises from the wage
differences between firms in the same industry paid to workers with similar characteristics, i.e. within-industry
26
Proposition 10. Trade liberalization increases between-group wage inequality and has an
ambiguous effect on wage inequality among all employed workers.
Proof. See appendix F.
4 Conclusion
Previous trade models did not reconcile heterogeneous firms, labor market frictions and infor-
mality in the form of registration non-compliance. In this paper, I developed a simple general
equilibrium trade model with one production factor, namely labor. Firms in the model are
heterogeneous in productivity and pay a fair wage depending on the firm’s productivity and
the average wage of employed workers in the economy. Depending on their productivity,
firms select into informal sector production, formal sector production or exporting. By in-
troducing informality into heterogeneous firm trade models with labor market frictions, the
model shows analytically how informality distorts resource allocation in an economy. Trade
liberalization leads to a decrease in informal sector employment and affects formal sector
employment ambiguously. Depending on the characteristics of the economy, total employ-
ment and welfare can either decrease or increase. Opening the economy to trade affects wage
inequality among employed workers ambiguously and ultimately depends on the number of
formal sector firms relative to informal sector firms in the economy. Wage inequality between
informal and formal workers increases as the formal sector average wage rises faster than the
average wage earned by informal sector workers.
The implication of this framework for policy-makers is clear. While trade liberalization
achieves the often targeted reduction in informal employment, the economic conditions in a
country ultimately determine whether trade is beneficial or detrimental in regard to employ-
ment, welfare and wage inequality in the presence of informality. Hence, this setup emphasizes
the need to consider the existence of an informal sector and the economic environment jointly
in policy decisions on trade.
Several extensions of this work would provide for interesting future research endeavors.
First, replacing the productivity sharing motif of the fair wage specification with revenue
sharing would shed light on an additional source of wage inequality, i.e. an exporter wage
premium, and can possibly entail different distributional consequences than the present work.
Second, including heterogeneous workers and allowing firms to hire both informal and formal
wage inequality. Moreover, wage inequality is driven by the employment adjustments of these firms upon trade
liberalization.
27
workers is a useful extension to capture the empirical findings of works with labor market-
specific definitions of informality. Lastly, introducing informality with a broader definition as
tax evasion and registration non-compliance and in a public finance framework would inform
optimal taxation and enforcement decisions in the presence of an informal sector.
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Appendix
A Comparative statics on the relative productivity difference
in autarky
I analyze (14) in a comparative statics exercise to analyze the effect of the parameters of
interest on the relative productivity distance:
ϕ∗f − ϕ
∗
i
ϕ∗f
= 1−
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗f
=1−
(
fi
ff − fi
) 1
ξ (
(1− λ)−ξ − (1− δ)σ
) 1
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−σ
ξ .
∂
ϕ∗i
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f
∂fi
=
1
ξ
(
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ff − fi
) 1
ξ
−1( ff
(ff − fi)2
)(
(1− λ)−ξ − (1− δ)σ
) 1
ξ
(1− δ)
−σ
ξ > 0.
∂
ϕ∗i
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f
∂ff
=
1
ξ
(
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ff − fi
) 1
ξ
−1( −fi
(ff − fi)2
)(
(1− λ)−ξ − (1− δ)σ
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(1− δ)
−σ
ξ < 0.
∂
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=
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) 1
ξ
[
σ
ξ
(1− δ)
−σ
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−1
(
(1− λ)−ξ − (1− δ)σ
) 1
ξ
+
(1− δ)
−σ
ξ
σ
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(
(1− λ)−ξ − (1− δ)σ
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∂
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f
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=
(
fi
ff − fi
) 1
ξ
(1− δ)
−σ
ξ
(
(1− λ)−ξ − (1− δ)σ
) 1
ξ
−1
(1− λ)−ξ−1 > 0.
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B Comparative statics on informal relative to formal employ-
ment share in autarky
I analyze (20) in a comparative statics exercise to analyze the effect of the parameters of
interest on the relative employment in the two sectors:
Ei
Ef
=(1− δ)σ(1− λ)σ(1−θ)−1
[(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗f
)χ
− 1
]
.
∂ Ei
Ef
∂fi
=(1− δ)σ(1− λ)σ(1−θ)−1χ
(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗f
)χ−1 ∂ ϕ∗i
ϕ∗
f
∂fi
< 0.
∂ Ei
Ef
∂ff
=(1− δ)σ(1− λ)σ(1−θ)−1χ
(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗f
)χ−1 ∂ ϕ∗i
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f
∂ff
> 0.
∂ Ei
Ef
∂δ
=− σ(1− δ)σ−1(1− λ)σ(1−θ)−1
[(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗f
)χ
− 1
]
+ (1− δ)σ(1− λ)σ(1−θ)−1χ
(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗f
)χ−1 ∂ ϕ∗i
ϕ∗
f
∂δ
< 0.
∂ Ei
Ef
∂λ
=− (σ(1− θ)− 1)(1− δ)σ(1− λ)σ(1−θ)−2
[(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗f
)χ
− 1
]
+ (1− δ)σ(1− λ)σ(1−θ)−1χ
(
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗f
)χ−1 ∂ ϕ∗i
ϕ∗
f
∂λ
< 0.
C Wage inequality in autarky
First, I compute the Lorenz curve by relating the share of employment to the share of the
wage bill. Using the Lorenz curve, I derive the Gini-coefficient.
Purely-formal economy
Share in employment of firms with productivity below ϕ¯:
γf (ϕ) =
∫ ϕ¯
ϕ∗
f
lf (ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ∫∞
ϕ∗
f
lf (ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
= 1−
(
ϕ¯
ϕ∗
f
)χ
Share in wage bill of firms with productivity below ϕ¯:
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Qf (ϕ) =
∫ ϕ¯
ϕ∗
f
lf (ϕ)wf (ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ∫∞
ϕ∗
f
lf (ϕ)wf (ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
= 1−
(
ϕ¯
ϕ∗
f
)ξ−k
The Lorenz curve is Qf (γf ) = 1− (1− γf )
ξ−k
χ and the Gini-coefficient follows from
Gf = 1− 2
∫ 1
0 Qf (γf )dγf =
θ
θ−2(ξ−k) .
Purely-informal economy
Share in employment of firms with productivity below ϕ¯:
γi(ϕ) =
∫ ϕ¯
ϕ∗
i
li(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ∫∞
ϕ∗
i
li(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
= 1−
(
ϕ¯
ϕ∗i
)χ
Share in wage bill of firms with productivity below ϕ¯:
Qi(ϕ) =
∫ ϕ¯
ϕ∗
i
li(ϕ)wi(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ∫∞
ϕ∗
i
li(ϕ)wi(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
= 1−
(
ϕ¯
ϕ∗i
)ξ−k
The Lorenz curve is Qi(γi) = 1− (1− γi)
ξ−k
χ and the Gini-coefficient follows from
Gi = 1− 2
∫ 1
0 Qi(γi)dγi =
θ
θ−2(ξ−k) .
As a purely-formal and purely-informal economy have the same Gini-coefficient, they fea-
ture the same wage inequality. Because the wage distribution directly depends on the Pareto
distribution, productivity dispersion among firms in the economy determines wage inequality,
that is
∂Gf
∂k
= −2θ
[θ−2(ξ−k)]2
< 0. Hence, wage inequality measured by the Gini coefficient, is
increasing in firm productivity dispersion (lower k). As supported by the literature, higher
dispersion of firm productivity creates higher wage inequality by spreading out the range of
wages paid in the economy. This is empirically supported by Davis and Haltiwanger (1991)
and Faggio et al. (2010) and has theoretically been shown in Helpman et al. (2010) and Egger
and Kreickemeier (2012).
Economy with informal and formal sector
I first estimate the Lorenz curve and then derive the Gini-coefficient. However, I have to
distinguish between informal and formal workers. The Lorenz curve then consists of two
segments. The first share of workers is employed in the informal sector:
Share in employment of firms with productivity below ϕ¯:
γ =
∫ ϕ¯
ϕ∗
i
li(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
∫ ϕ∗f
ϕ∗
i
li(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ+
∫∞
ϕ∗
f
lf (ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
=
(1−δ)σ
[
1−
(
ϕ¯
ϕ∗
i
)χ]
Γ ,
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where Γ ≡ (1− δ)σ −
[
(1− δ)σ − (1− λ)−ξ+θ
] (ϕ∗f
ϕ∗i
)χ
.
Share in wage bill of firms with productivity below ϕ¯:
Qi =
∫ ϕ¯
ϕ∗
i
li(ϕ)wi(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
∫ ϕ∗f
ϕ∗
i
li(ϕ)wi(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ+
∫∞
ϕ∗
f
lf (ϕ)wf (ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
=
(1−δ)σ
[
1−
(
ϕ¯
ϕ∗
i
)ξ−k]
∆ ,
where ∆ ≡ (1− δ)σ −
[
(1− δ)σ − (1− λ)−ξ
] (ϕ∗f
ϕ∗i
)ξ−k
.
The first segment of the Lorenz curve is Qi(γ) =
(1−δ)σ
∆
[
1−
[
1− γΓ(1−δ)σ
] ξ−k
χ
]
.
Second, including workers employed in the formal sector:
Share in employment of firms with productivity below ϕ¯:
γ =
∫ ϕ∗f
ϕ∗
i
li(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ϕ¯
ϕ∗
f
lf (ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
∫ ϕ∗f
ϕ∗
i
li(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ+
∫∞
ϕ∗
f
lf (ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
= 1−
(
ϕ¯
ϕ∗
i
)χ
(1−λ)−ξ+θ
Γ
Share in wage bill of firms with productivity below ϕ¯:
Qf =
∫ ϕ∗f
ϕ∗
i
li(ϕ)wi(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ϕ¯
ϕ∗
f
lf (ϕ)wf (ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
∫ ϕ∗f
ϕ∗
i
li(ϕ)wi(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ+
∫∞
ϕ∗
f
lf (ϕ)wf (ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
= 1−
(
ϕ¯
ϕ∗
i
)ξ−k
(1−λ)−ξ
∆
The second segment of the Lorenz curve is Qf (γ) = 1−
(1−λ)−ξ
∆
[
(1−γ)Γ
(1−λ)−ξ+θ
] ξ−k
χ
.
Jointly, the Lorenz curve is described by Q(γ) =

Qi(γ) if γ ∈ [0, bi)Qf (γ) if γ ∈ [bi, 1] ,
where bi =
(1−δ)σ
[
1−
(
ϕ∗
f
ϕ∗
i
)χ]
Γ is the share of workers employed in the informal sector.
The Lorenz curve Q(γ) has the desired properties Qi(bi) = Qf (bi), Q(0) = 0, Q(1) = 1
and ∂Q(γ)
∂γ
> 0.
The Gini-coefficient follows from G = 1− 2
∫ 1
0 Q(γ)dγ:
G = Gf
[
1 + 2φ
k−ξ
θΓ∆
{
χ
[
Υ− Ξφθ + [Ξ−Υ]φ−χ
]
+ θΥ [1− φ−χ]
}]
, where φ ≡
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗
f
∈ (0, 1).
G > Gf if
χ
−θ
[
1 + ΞΥ
[φ−χ−φθ]
[1−φ−χ]
]
− 1 > 0.
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Hence, I analyze f(φ) = χ
−θ
[
1 + ΞΥ
[φ−χ−φθ]
[1−φ−χ]
]
− 1 for φ ∈ (0, 1)
limφ→0 f(φ) =
k−ξ
θ
> 0
Using L’hoˆpital’s rule, it is clear that limx→c
g(φ)
h(φ) = limx→c
g′(φ)
h′(φ) . Hence,
limφ→1 f(φ) =
k−ξ
θ
− χ
θ
Ξ
Υ limφ→1
[
−1− θ
χ
φχ+θ
]
= k−ξ
θ
[
Υ−Ξ
Υ
]
> 0
Lastly, I show that f(φ) is strictly monotone in φ ∈ (0, 1). Using the L’hoˆpital’s mono-
tonicity rule,30 it is clear that g(φ)
h(φ) is strictly monotone in φ if
g′(φ)
h′(φ) is strictly monotone
in φ on (a, b) with f(a) = g(a) = 0 or f(b) = g(b) = 0. Accordingly, I find
∂
(
f ′(φ)
g′(φ)
)
∂φ
=
Ξ
Υ(ξ − k)φ
θ+χ−1 < 0.
As f(φ) is strictly monotone and > 0 in φ ∈ (0, 1), the Gini-coefficient of the economy
with informality is strictly larger than the one of a purely-formal economy. That means
independent of its size, the existence of an informal sector increases wage inequality among ex-
ante identical workers. Intuitively, the two-sector economy wage distribution is characterized
by a discrete jump in the form of an informal sector wage gap. As part of the population
receives a lower wage, not just because of the firm productivity dispersion, but also because
of the wage gap, wage inequality has to be higher.
D Comparative statics on the relative productivity difference
with trade
I analyze (28) in a comparative statics exercise to analyze the effect of the parameters of
interest on the relative productivity distance:
30See Lemma 2.2 in Anderson et al. (1993) for a detailed explanation and proof of the L’hoˆpital’s mono-
tonicity rule.
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E Wage inequality with trade
I first estimate the Lorenz curve and then derive the Gini-coefficient. For this Gini-coefficient
I have to distinguish three segments: informal workers, formal workers and export firm work-
ers. Accordingly, the Lorenz curve consists of three segments. The first share of workers is
employed in the informal sector:
Share in employment of firms with productivity below ϕ¯:
γ =
∫ ϕ¯
ϕ∗
i
li(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ
∫ ϕ∗f
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i
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.
Share in wage bill of firms with productivity below ϕ¯:
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The first segment of the Lorenz curve is Q1(γ) =
(1−δ)σ
∆+Ω
[
1−
[
1− γ[Γ+Ψ](1−δ)σ
] ξ−k
χ
]
.
Second, including formal workers:
Share in employment of firms with productivity below ϕ¯:
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Share in wage bill of firms with productivity below ϕ¯:
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The second segment of the Lorenz curve is Q2(γ) =
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Third, including workers employed in exporting firms:
Share in employment of firms with productivity below ϕ¯:
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Share in wage bill of firms with productivity below ϕ¯:
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The last segment of the Lorenz curve isQ3(γ) = 1−
(1+nτ1−σ)(1−λ)−ξ
∆+Ω
[
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.
Jointly, the Lorenz curve is described by Q(γ) =


Q1(γ) if γ ∈ [0, bi)
Q2(γ) if γ ∈ [bi, bf )
Q3(γ) if γ ∈ [bf , 1]
,
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where bi =
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)χ]
Γ+Ψ is the share of workers employed in the informal sector and
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Γ−(1−λ)−ξ+θ
(
ϕ∗x
ϕ∗
i
)
Γ+Ψ is the share of workers employed in non-exporting firms.
The Lorenz curve Q(γ) has the desired properties Q1(b1) = Q2(b1), Q2(b2) = Q3(b2),
Q(0) = 0, Q(1) = 1 and ∂Q(γ)
∂γ
> 0.
The Gini-coefficient follows from G = 1− 2
∫ 1
0 Q(γ)dγ:
G =Gf
[
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{
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]
+ (1− λ)−2ξ+θnτ1−σµk−ξ−χφk−ξ
]}]
, where µ ≡
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗x
.
F Numerical simulation for the key variables
Because of the complexity of the equations, I show that the aggregate output of the informal
sector, formal sector and entire economy, and the formal and total employment can increase
or decrease upon trade liberalization. To do this I compute the numerical value of the key
variables in autarky and upon trade liberalization for three scenarios with different economy
parameters within the assumptions of the model, as summarized in table 1. I then calculate
the ratio of the trade variable relative to the respective autarky variable and show that the
ratio can be greater or less than 1.
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Table 1: Economy parameters for two scenarios.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Total workforce L 1.0 1.0 1.0
Elasticity of substitution σ 3.8 2.3 5.95
Pareto distribution parameter k 3.4 3.5 4.0
Formal fixed cost ff 1.0 1.2 3.0
Informal fixed cost fi 0.3 0.5 0.7
Exporting fixed cost fx 1.5 3.0 4.0
Fairness parameter θ 0.5 0.4 0.2
Productivity bonus λ 0.5 0.3 0.1
Iceberg transportation cost τ 1.7 1.4 2.5
Number of foreign countries n 5 1 10
Probability of detection δ 0.0 0.0 0.0
The parameter specifications in table 1 are within the following constraints of the various
Propositions and assumptions of the model:
• [1− δ]
σ
ξ < 11−λ <
[
ff
fi
(1− δ)σ
] 1
ξ
• k+1−θ1−θ > σ >
1
1−θ
• fxτ
ξ
1−θ
n(1−λ)−ξ
>
ff−fi
(1−λ)−ξ−(1−δ)σ
The equations for the key variables are as follows:
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ξ
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k
ξ
(
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) ξ−k
ξ
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k
ξ
(
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) k−ξ
ξ
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θ
ξ
−1

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(
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ξ
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1 + n
(
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−kσ
ξ
]−θ
ξ

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(
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) ξ−k
ξ
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σ(ξ−k)
ξ
((1− λ)−ξ − (1− δ)σ)
k
ξ
(
fi
ff−fi
) k−ξ
ξ
(1− δ)
σ(ξ−k)
ξ + (1− δ)σ


θ
ξ
−1

1 + nτ1−σ
((
(ff − fi)nτ
1−σ
fx
)−1
ξ (
(1− λ)−ξ − (1− δ)σ
) 1
ξ
(1− λ)
)χ .
Ei(t)
Ei(a)
=
[
1 + n
(
fx
finτ1−σ
)−k
ξ
(1− λ)−k(1− δ)
−kσ
ξ
]−θ
ξ

1 + (1− λ)
−k(nτ1−σ)
k
ξ
(
fx
fi
) ξ−k
ξ
(1− δ)
σ(ξ−k)
ξ
((1− λ)−ξ − (1− δ)σ)
k
ξ
(
fi
ff−fi
) k−ξ
ξ
(1− δ)
σ(ξ−k)
ξ + (1− δ)σ


θ
ξ
−1
.
38
(Eiw¯i + Ef w¯f )(t)
(Eiw¯i + Ef w¯f )(a)
=
[
1 + n
(
fx
finτ1−σ
)−k
ξ
(1− λ)−k(1− δ)
−kσ
ξ
] −k
ξ(k+1)

1 + (1− λ)
−k(nτ1−σ)
k
ξ
(
fx
fi
) ξ−k
ξ
(1− δ)
σ(ξ−k)
ξ
((1− λ)−ξ − (1− δ)σ)
k
ξ
(
fi
ff−fi
) k−ξ
ξ
(1− δ)
σ(ξ−k)
ξ + (1− δ)σ


ξ+k
ξ(k+1)
,
where
Y(t)
Y(a)
=
(Eiw¯i+Ef w¯f )(t)
(Eiw¯i+Ef w¯f )(a)
.
(Ef w¯f )(t)
(Ef w¯f )(a)
=
[
1 + n
(
fx
finτ1−σ
)−k
ξ
(1− λ)−k(1− δ)
−kσ
ξ
] −k
ξ(k+1)

1 + (1− λ)
−k(nτ1−σ)
k
ξ
(
fx
fi
) ξ−k
ξ
(1− δ)
σ(ξ−k)
ξ
((1− λ)−ξ − (1− δ)σ)
k
ξ
(
fi
ff−fi
) k−ξ
ξ
(1− δ)
σ(ξ−k)
ξ + (1− δ)σ


k(1−ξ)
ξ(k+1)

1 + nτ1−σ
((
(ff − fi)nτ
1−σ)
fx
)−1
ξ (
(1− λ)−ξ − (1− δ)σ
) 1
ξ
(1− λ)
)ξ−k ,
where Yf =
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where Yi =
Eiw¯iL
ρ
and
Yi(t)
Yi(a)
=
(Eiw¯i)(t)
(Eiw¯i)(a)
.
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G(a) = Gf

1 + 2
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ϕ∗
f
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θΓ∆

χ

Υ− Ξ
(
ϕ∗i
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)θ
+ [Ξ−Υ]
(
ϕ∗i
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G(t) =Gf
[
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2φk−ξ
θ(Γ + Ψ)(∆ + Ω)
{
χ
[
Υ− Ξφθ + [Ξ−Υ]φ−χ + (1− λ)−2ξ+θnτ1−σ
[
µ−χφk−ξ − µk−ξφ−χ
]
+µk−ξ(1− δ)σ(1− λ)−ξnτ1−σ
[
φ−χ − 1
]
+ µ−χ(1− δ)σ(1− λ)−ξ+θnτ1−σ
[
1− φk−ξ
]]
+θ
[
Υ
[
1− φ−χ
]
+ (1− λ)−2ξ+θnτ1−σµk−ξ−χφk−ξ
]}]
.
The results are summarized in table 2. The three scenarios highlight the different im-
pact that trade liberalization has, given the various economic parameters. In scenario 1,
total employment, formal employment and aggregate formal output increase, while infor-
mal employment, aggregate informal output, total aggregate output and the Gini-coefficient
decrease. In scenario 2, formal employment, aggregate informal output, aggregate formal
output, total aggregate output and the Gini-coefficient increase, while informal and total em-
ployment decrease. Lastly, scenario 3 leads to yet another outcome upon trade liberalization.
Employment and aggregate output of all sectors and the entire economy decrease, but the
Gini-coefficient increases. Hence, the effect of trade liberalization on all variables, except for
informal employment, is ambiguous and depends on the parameters of the economy.
Table 2: Numerical results of the key variables with trade liberalization relative to autarky.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
E(t)/E(a) 1.11241 0.99977 0.99346
Ef(t)/Ef(a) 1.25219 1.09506 0.98681
Ei(t)/Ei(a) 0.67790 0.99947 0.89984
Y(t)/Y(a) 0.66809 1.00097 0.99051
Yf(t)/Yf(a) 1.45032 4.41278 0.99576
Yi(t)/Yi(a) 0.59766 1.00005 0.89783
G(t)/G(a) 0.91485 1.00796 1.00033
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